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INTRODUCTION
WHO ARE THESE PEOPLE?
Justin Aaberg
1995–2010
Anoka, Minnesota
Alexa Berman
1994–2008
Brookfield, Connecticut
Ryan Halligan
1990–2003
Essex Junction, Vermont
Brian Head
1979–1994
Woodstock, Georgia
Kameron Jacobsen
1997–2011
Monroe, New York
Jeffrey Johnston
1990–2005
Cape Coral, Florida
Samantha Kelly
1996 – 2010
Huron Township, Michigan
Jessica Laney
1996–2012
Hudson, Florida
Jesse Logan
1990–2008
Cincinnati, Ohio
Megan Taylor Meier
1992–2006
Dardenne Prairie, Missouri
Rachael Neblett
1989–2006
Mount Washington, Kentucky
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Alexis Skye Pilkington
1993–2010
West Islip, New York
Phoebe Nora Mary Prince
1994–2010
South Hadley, Massachusetts
Jamey Rodemeyer
1997–2011
Buffalo, New York
Curtis Taylor
1979–1993
Burlington, Iowa
Hope Witsell
1996–2009
Ruskin/Hillsborough, Florida
These were school children, all under the age of eighteen, who died too young.
These children were not shot down in their classrooms. They did not overdose on
illegal drugs. They were not killed by drunk drivers. These school children died as
a result of actions committed by other school children—actions that could have been
prevented by vigilant school administrators.
Some may argue that this is an overly dramatic way to begin a law review article.
Yet, we find that it is sometimes easy for “formal literature”—such as scholarly
articles or legal opinions—to take too sterile and academic a view of life. While
academic “distance” may be conducive to clear-headed and logical analysis, it also
puts a false emotional barrier between theories and the practical impacts that they
ultimately have on real people. We are guilty of this ourselves. In early drafts of
this article, the names you see above appeared as a footnote to the sentence:
Media reports have described one tragic case after another of student
bullying and cyber bullying leading to violence and suicides.
Upon reflection, we were at first uncomfortable with, and finally ashamed by the
fact that, in dealing with a topic as critical as cyber bullying and free speech, we had
literally relegated the victims to a footnote.1
1

Further information on these child victims can be found in the following
references. The first high profile case of cyber bullying appears to be that of Megan Meier:
MySpace Mom Linked to Missouri Teen’s Suicide Being Cyber-Bullied Herself, FOX NEWS
(Dec. 7, 2007), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,315684,00.html. Numerous cases have
been reported since then. See Matt Gutman, ‘Text Rage’ Leads to Alleged Brutal Teen
Beating, ABC NEWS (Mar. 19, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/TheLaw/text-rageleads-alleged-brutal-teen-beating/story?id=10148892 (describing teen that was almost beaten
to death after flurry of text messages); Helen Kennedy, Phoebe Prince, South Hadley High
School's 'New Girl,' Driven to Suicide by Teenage Cyber Bullies, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 29,
2010 (describing a Massachusetts teen that committed suicide after being bullied; and the
bullies were indicted); Cyberbullying Continued After Teen’s Death, CBS NEWS (Mar. 29,
2010),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/03/29/earlyshow/main6343077.shtml
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School climate is a concept that has been recognized and studied for over fifty
years.2 It has been described metaphorically thus: “Personality is to the individual
what climate is to the [school].”3 School climate consists of several elements:
ecology, milieu, social system, and culture.4 It is important because schools do not
merely teach academic subjects. A critical part of the work of schools is
socialization—inculcating traditions, customs and social mores in children.5 This
task is accomplished didactically to be sure, but also by modeling—namely students
follow the example of teachers and administrators—and by creating an environment,
a climate, that is accepting and tolerant of appropriate conduct, while rejecting
inappropriate conduct. And, the Supreme Court has recognized that in dealing with
school children, school administrators may prohibit and punish conduct that, in any
other context done by any other citizen, would be afforded constitutional protection.6
(describing that after a teen’s suicide, taunts on social media sites continued); Andy Birkey,
Mother of Suicide Victim Speaks Out on Bullying at Anoka-Hennepin, MN. INDEP., Sept. 14,
2010,
http://minnesotaindependent.com/64978/wcco-mother-justin-aaberg-lgbt-bullyinganoka-hennepin (describing that teen committed suicide after anti-gay bullying); Greg Cergol,
Teens Charged in Anti-Gay Bias Attack on L.I., NBC 4 N.Y. (Oct. 21, 2010),
http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/Teens-Charged-in-Anti-Gay-Bias-Attack-on-LI104950939.html (describing teens that were charged for bullying; a bus driver and monitor
fail to report the incident as well); Rheana Murray, Cyber-Bullying, Social Media Blamed
after Florida Teen Commits Suicide, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 12, 2012,; Bog Greene, Why
Weren’t You His Friends, JEWISH WORLD REV. (Mar. 19, 2001), http://www.jewishworld
review.com/bob/greene031901.asp; Teens Who Have Committed Suicide After Being Bullied
Online, NAT’L PUBLIC RADIO (Sept. 20, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php
?storyId=130248877; Parents Speak Out on Bullying after Son’s Death, CBS NEWS (Sept. 15,
2011), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-500172_162-20106690/parents-speak-out-on-bullyingafter-sons-death/; Sarah Anne Hughes, Jamey Rodemeyer, Bullied Teen Who Made ‘It Gets
Better’ Video, Commits Suicide, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 2011.
2

See generally JAMES G. MARCH & HERBERT A. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS (1958); Chris
Argyris, Some Problems in Conceptualizing Organizational Climate: A Case Study of a Bank,
2 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 501 (1958); Benjamin Schneider & C.J. Bartlett, Individual Differences in
Organizational Climate, 21 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 323 (1968).
3

ANDREW W. HALPIN & DON B. CROFT, THE ORGANIZATIONAL CLIMATE OF SCHOOLS 1
(1963); see also John I. Nwanko, The School Climate as a Factor in Students’ Conflict in
Nigeria, 10 EDUC. STUD. 267 (1979).
4

Renato Taguiri, The Concept of Organizational Climate, in ORGANIZATIONAL CLIMATE:
EXPLORATION OF A CONCEPT (Renato Taguiri & George H. Litwin eds., 1968).
5

Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 54 (2d Cir. 2008). “Local school authorities have the
difficult task of teaching ‘the shared values of a civilized social order’—values that include
our veneration of free expression and civility, the importance we place on the right of dissent
and on proper respect for authority.” Id. (citing Bethel v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986));
see also J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. 2002).
6

Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47j v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (holding individualized suspicion
not required to support drug testing students to deter their drug use); New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325 (1985) (rejecting probable cause requirement or need for warrants for school
officials to search student); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (refusing to extend
Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment element to apply to corporal punishment of
students); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (requiring only minimal process for temporary
disciplinary suspensions in schools).
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One part of creating a positive school climate is teaching children to respect the
rights of others.7 A symptom of the breakdown of this respect, familiar to anyone
who has attended school, is bullying. 8 Bullying is nothing new. Yet, due to the
many tragic outcomes with which we began this Article, bullying, including the
subset of bullying via electronic means referred to as cyber bullying,9 has recently
received a great deal of attention from lawmakers and regulators. 10
Forty-nine states have enacted bullying legislation in some form, many of which
include language specifically aimed at preventing and addressing cyber bullying.11
7
Robert White & Nasir Warfa, Building Schools of Character: A Case-Study
Investigation of Character Education’s Impact on School Climate, Pupil Behavior, and
Curriculum Delivery, 41 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 45, 57-58 (2011).
8

Bullying has been defined as “unwanted, aggressive behavior among school aged
children that involves a real or perceived power imbalance.” Bullying Definition,
STOPBULLYING.GOV, http://www.stopbullying.gov/what-is-bullying/definition/index.html (last
visited Mar. 21, 2013).
9
Unless otherwise stated in this Article, the term “bullying” is intended to include the
subcategory of “cyber bullying.”
10

See sources cited supra note 1.

11

ALA. CODE § 16-28B-4 (LexisNexis 2012); ALASKA STAT. § 14.33.200 (2013); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. § 15-341 (LexisNexis 2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-217 (2012) (declaring that
cyber bullying is punishable as Class B misdemeanor); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48900(r) (Deering
2012); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-32-109.1 (2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-222d (2012); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4112D (2013); D.C. CODE § 5-B2502.3 (LexisNexis 2012); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 1006.147 (LexisNexis 2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-751.4 (2012); HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 8-19-2, 8-19-6 (LexisNexis 2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-917A (2012) (declaring
bullying criminal); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/27-23.7 (LexisNexis 2012); IND. CODE ANN.
§§ 20-33-8-0.2, 20-33-8-13.5 (LexisNexis 2012); IOWA CODE ANN. § 280.28 (West 2013);
KAN. STAT. ANN. §72-8256 (West 2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 525.080 (LexisNexis 2012)
(proscribing as Class B misdemeanor); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §14:40.7 (2013) (criminally
sanctioning cyber bullying but relegating offenders under the age of seventeen to Title VII of
the Children’s Code for disposition); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 20-A, § 1001(15)(H) (2012); MD.
CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-424.3 (LexisNexis 2012); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 71, § 37O
(LexisNexis 2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 380.1310b (LexisNexis 2012); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 121A.0695 (West 2013); MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-11-67 (2012); MO. ANN. STAT. §
160.775 (West 2012); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 79-267, 79-2,137 (LexisNexis 2012); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 388.122, 388.123, 388.135 (LexisNexis 2012); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
193-F:3, 193-F:4 (LexisNexis 2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:37-15, 18A:37-15.1 (West
2012); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-2-21 (LexisNexis 2012); N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 11(7), 12 (Consol.
2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458.1 (2013) (declaring cyber bullying criminal); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 15.1-19-17, 15.1-19-18 (2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3301.22, 3313.666
(LexisNexis 2012); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 24-100.4 (West 2012); OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 339.351, 399.356 (West 2012); 24 PA. STAT. ANN. § 13-1303.1-A (West 2012); R.I. GEN.
LAWS 16-21-34 (2012); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 59-63-120, 59-63-130 (2013); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS §§ 13-32-15, 13-32-16, 13-32-18 (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 49-6-1015, 49-6-1016
(2013); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 37.0832 (West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53A-11a-102,
53A-11a-102-201 (LexisNexis 2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 11(a)(32) (2012); VA. CODE
ANN. § 22.1-279.6 (2012); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 28A.300.285 (LexisNexis 2012); W.
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18-2C-2, 18-2C-3 (LexisNexis 2012); WIS. STAT. § 118.46 (2012); WYO.
STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4-312, 21-4-313 (2012); see also Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin,
State Cyber-Bullying Laws: A Brief Review of State Cyber-Bullying Laws and Policies,
CYBERBULLYING RESEARCH CTR. (Apr. 2013), available at http://www.cyberbullying.
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The United States Congress has proposed, but failed to enact, legislation that would
criminally sanction cyber bullying.12
The Department of Education has more aggressively entered the fray. The Office
for Civil Rights (OCR) addresses bullying and cyber bullying under the auspices of
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972, and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.13 Since 2009, the OCR has maintained a
national database14 containing reports of and responses to bullying and harassment
on the bases of disability, race, and gender.15 The database allows web visitors to
produce reports of bullying and harassment incidences aggregated at the state,
district, and campus level.
The issue of cyber bullying is more complicated from a legal perspective than
“traditional” bullying. Cyber bullying generally involves communication via
electronic means. Most such communications will, by their nature, constitute
“speech” as that word is understood legally. As a consequence, regulation of cyber
bullying potentially raises First Amendment student free speech issues. In addition,
due to the ubiquity of electronic media, cyber bullying conduct which often
originates off campus can easily make its way on campus, and potentially disrupt the
learning environment and/or directly affect students in that environment.16 Free
speech protections and the off campus/on campus issue are both concerns applicable
to cyber bullying that are not necessarily implicated by traditional bullying.17
us/Bullying_and_Cyberbullying_Laws.pdf (cataloging cyber bullying statutes state by state).
The only state currently lacking bullying legislation is the state of Montana. Although no
“bullying” law exists, the Montana Department of Justice makes it clear that bullying and
cyber bullying activity is prohibited under many existing laws. For Teens & Tweens:
Cyberbullying, MONT. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://doj.mt.gov/safeinyourspace/for-teens-tweenscyberbullying/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2013) (defining cyber bullying and citing numerous
Montana criminal provisions potentially implicated by wrongful conduct).
12

Bullying Prevention and Intervention Act of 2011, H.R. 83, 112th Cong. (2011)
(introduced by Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee on January 5, 2011, but died in committee).
13

Letter from Russlynn Ali, Asst. Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t. of Educ., to
Colleague (Oct. 26, 2010), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/coll
eague-201010.pdf. OCR also points out that the Department of Justice retains jurisdiction
over bullying acts that implicate Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 1.
14

Civil Rights Data Collection, OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T.
http://ocrdata.ed.gov/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2013).

OF

EDUC.,

15
U. S. DEP’T. OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, SY 2011-12 CRDC DEFINITIONS: PART
1 AND PART 2 (2011), available at http://crdc.ed.gov/downloads/10%20SY%20201112%20CRDC%20Definitions.pdf.
16
James A. O'Shaughnessy, Is Cyber-Bullying the Next “Columbine”: Can New
Hampshire Schools Prevent Cyber-Bullying and Avoid Liability?, 52 N.H.B.J. 42, 44 (2011)
(citing Doninger v. Niehoff, 594 F. Supp. 2d 211, 223 (D. Conn 2009), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011)).
17
See Christine Metteer Lorillard, When Children's Rights “Collide”: Free Speech vs. The
Right to be Let Alone in the Context of Off-Campus “Cyber-Bullying,” 81 MISS. L.J. 189, 192
(2011). The rise of the Internet has created issues in other legal areas as well. See Ashcroft v.
Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 566 (2002) (stating that the unique nature of Internet
impacting application of community standards jurisprudence to that medium).
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Cyber bullying has generally been dealt with by the courts using one of two legal
analyses: the “true threats” doctrine, or the Tinker substantial disruption test. This
law review, the Cleveland State Law Review, recently published Anti-Cyber Bullying
Statutes: Threat to Student Free Speech18 (referred to herein as “the Threat to Speech
article”), which addressed these two theories, and argued that the current evolution
of cyber bullying legislation simply goes too far. For example, Hayward states
Anti-cyber bullying laws are the greatest threat to student speech because
they seek to censor it anytime it occurs, using “substantial disruption” of
school activities as justification and often based only on mere suspicion of
potential disruption.19
The Threat to Speech article advocates greater protection of student speech.
While we recognize that any regulation of speech by the state20 may raise First
Amendment concerns, we are not so quick to conclude that cyber bullying
regulations “chill student free speech.”21
Our analysis of the law leads us to the conclusion that school administrators have
relatively broad discretion to regulate student speech, provided those regulations
either serve legitimate pedagogical ends or protect the rights of other students and
the school environment. Indeed, as we will demonstrate below, the evolution of the
Supreme Court’s student free speech jurisprudence has followed the trend of
granting more and more leeway to administrators. Contrary to the claims in the
Threat to Speech article, in our opinion that leeway clearly extends to allowing
regulation of speech which originates off campus but has a reasonable likelihood of
making its way on campus. We also believe that, in addition to true threats and the
Tinker substantial disruption standard described in the Threat to Speech article,
school administrators may also regulate student speech consistent with the Court’s
holding in Fraser—which set what we refer to as the “fundamental values standard”
—and based on the fighting words doctrine.
In order to properly analyze the current scope of constitutional protections
surrounding student speech rights, it is important to understand the historic
relationship between students, teachers, and administrators. Thus, we begin our
analysis in Section I with an overview of the history of public schools from the
perspective of regulation of student conduct. In Part I, we seek to provide historical
context for regulation of student conduct by describing the state of the affairs in
schools before Supreme Court intervention.
18

John O. Hayward, Anti-Cyber Bullying Statutes: Threat to Student Free Speech, 59
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 85 (2011).
19

Id. at 123.

20

In this Article, we address only state regulation of cyber bullying in primary and
secondary schools. Private school regulation requires a somewhat modified analysis as
actions by those schools are not clearly “state action” implicating the First Amendment. Nor
do we address post-secondary institutions, as students in colleges and universities will
typically be over the age of eighteen, thus adding an additional layer to be considered vis-à-vis
the First Amendment. In addition, the history of academic freedom in post-secondary
education is significantly different from that in primary and secondary education, and would
take us well beyond the historical analysis we provide in Part I.
21

Hayward, supra note 18, at 87.
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In Part II, we address Supreme Court school cases decided prior to the Court’s
seminal student speech case of Tinker v. Des Moines.22 Tinker was not handed down
in a vacuum, but is rather a point on a continuum of Supreme Court decisions
affecting student rights. Our aim in Part II is to give a bit of color to that continuum
in order to put Tinker into proper perspective.
Part III provides an analysis of Tinker and subsequent Supreme Court student
free speech cases. We believe that understanding the manner in which the Tinker
standard has—and has not—been used by the Court in subsequent decisions
provides critical guidance as to the Court’s likely view of cyber bullying regulation
in the context of student speech rights.
In Part IV, we synthesize the key elements of Parts I, II, and III into a coherent
student free speech paradigm for use by school administrators and legal counsel.
Part V then applies the paradigm to cyber bullying, and proposes two legal bases,
in addition to “true threats” and Tinker, for the management of cyber bullying in
public schools.
I. BEFORE THE COURT GOT INVOLVED
One approach to determining whether specific conduct is constitutionally
protected is to examine how the law has treated that conduct historically.23 For
example, because laws punishing defamation have existed from before the time the
Constitution was written, the Supreme Court has held that such laws do not violate
the Constitution.24 This approach to constitutional analysis has been summarized
thus, “A universal and long-established tradition of prohibiting certain conduct
creates a strong presumption that the prohibition is constitutional.”25 Applied to the
topic at hand—student speech—if a long history of regulation of student speech
exists, we must be very careful when we seek to alter or limit those regulations on
constitutional grounds. Justice Clarence Thomas, in his concurrence in the student
free speech case Morse v. Frederick,26 cited this principle to argue that, “the history
of public education suggests that the First Amendment, as originally understood,
does not protect student speech in public schools.”27
Thomas’s concurring opinion in Morse takes a strict constructionist approach to
the Constitution.28 After explaining that in early public schools, “teachers taught and
students listened,”29 Justice Thomas went on to cite a variety of court cases from
22

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1967).

23
Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2347 (2011). Carrigan relied on
this principle to hold that legislative recusal requirements, “commonplace for over 200 years,”
were constitutional. Id. at 2351.
24

Id.

25

Id.

26

Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007).

27

Id. at 410-11 (Thomas, J., concurring).

28

“The belief that the interpretation of the US Constitution should be based only on
adhering to the ‘original intent’ of those who drafted the Constitution or the amendment in
question.” Strict Construction(ism), THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF POLITICS (3d ed.
2009).
29

Morse, 551 U.S. at 412 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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different time periods—all of which dealt with issues stemming from disciplinary
decisions in public schools. Each of these cases illustrates that the management of
public schools, in particular decisions around student discipline, was rarely
challenged by the courts. Furthermore, the rulings Justice Thomas reviewed show
that student rights, to the extent that they existed at all, were definitely not on the
same plane as adults’ rights.30
Justice Thomas’s historical survey of the purpose and administration of early
U.S. public schools has merit. Our review of literature from earlier periods in U.S.
public education supports Justice Thomas’s notion that schools were not outlets for
young people to flex their constitutional rights, but rather places of learning in which
expectations were in place for the behavior of children and where deference to
school rules was not expected, but demanded. Public schools were afforded great
latitude in responding to student misconduct. Consider the following passage from a
treatise31 dated 1909, describing the disciplinary climate in public schools:
The relationship between teacher and pupil on the school-grounds is very
different from that existing between the same boy and a policeman in a
city park or in a courthouse yard. The teacher may arrest, try, judge and
punish. The policeman may only do the first.32
This sentiment is consistent with another work, published six years later in 1915,
describing the legal disciplinary authority of the teacher over her pupils as
“absolute,” recognizing the teacher as “a government agent vested with authority to
secure ends determined upon by the government,” specifically those around ensuring
an orderly learning environment and the development of future citizens.33 As we
will see, the role of schools in pursuing “ends determined upon by the government”
becomes a theme of considerable prevalence in latter Supreme Court student free
speech jurisprudence.
Consistent with this reasoning, in 1961 an education scholar explained that
teachers and principals stand particularly in loco parentis with regards to disciplinary
issues, stating that school personnel “must maintain discipline, and if a pupil
disobeys their orders, it is their duty to use reasonable means to compel compliance.”
34
Just four years later, the Supreme Court handed down its seminal student free
speech decision in Tinker which, from that point forward, made the Court’s
jurisprudence a factor in defining student-teacher relations.
As can be seen, the history of public school tradition prior to Supreme Court
intervention was one where the idea of “student rights,” and “student free speech
rights” in particular, was extremely limited, if it existed at all. Taking this history
into account, Justice Thomas’s argument in Morse takes on even greater strength;
namely, the protection of student speech rights as “set forth in [Tinker] is without
30

Id. at 411-20 (Thomas, J., concurring).

31

JOHN SOGARD, PUBLIC SCHOOL RELATIONSHIPS: CHAPTERS ON THE INTERRELATIONSHIPS
OF THE SCHOOL OFFICERS, THE TEACHERS, THE PUPILS AND THE COMMUNITY 23 (1909).
32

Id. at 123-24.

33

ARTHUR C. PERRY, DISCIPLINE AS A SCHOOL PROBLEM 160 (1915).

34

REYNOLDS C. SEITZ, LAW AND THE SCHOOL PRINCIPAL 124 (1961). The doctrine of in
loco parentis remains relevant to this day. See Lorillard, supra note 17, at 262.
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basis in the Constitution.”35 While we do not advocate abrogation of Tinker, we do
believe that a pragmatic analysis of student speech rights, and any claims that cyber
bullying (or other) legislation “chills student speech,” must take into account that a
very strong argument can be made that student speech is not entitled to any first
amendment free speech protection whatsoever. We do not take this position—but
we do believe that consideration of this history adds strength to the position that
school administrators have substantial leeway in reasonably regulating student
speech.
We will see below that, from this initial state where student speech rights were
non-existent, student rights began a slow evolution. Early Supreme Court cases
dealing with schools applied the lowest “rational basis” standard of review to
constitutional issues, granting school administrators substantial discretion. Over
time, the Court expanded student rights, making them essentially coextensive with
the constitutional rights of adults outside the schoolhouse. But, as we shall see, in its
most recent decisions the Court has changed direction, returning greater discretion to
school administrators.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF STUDENT FREE SPEECH RIGHTS
A. The State and Education in the 1920s
The first Supreme Court case to address public schools in any context was the
1923 decision of Meyer v. Nebraska.36 In Meyer, the Court addressed whether a
Nebraska statute prohibiting the teaching of any language other than English prior to
eighth grade was an unconstitutional infringement on liberty under the Fourteenth
Amendment.37 The Court struck down the statute as unconstitutional.38 In so doing,
the Court recognized that,
The power of the State to compel attendance at some school and to make
reasonable regulations for all schools, including a requirement that they
shall give instructions in English, is not questioned. Nor has challenge
been made of the State's power to prescribe a curriculum for institutions
which it supports. . . . We are constrained to conclude that the statute as
applied is arbitrary and without reasonable relation to any end within the
competency of the State.39
Thus, in Meyer, the Court for the first time squarely addressed the state’s interest
in educating its citizens balanced against fundamental constitutional protections, and
it held that the appropriate level of scrutiny was the lowest, rational basis test.40
While this was not a free speech case, it does provide perspective on the view the
Court took of the power of the state to regulate school related activity versus the
35

Morse, 551 U.S. at 410-11 (Thomas, J., concurring).

36

Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).

37

Id. at 396.

38

Id. at 403.

39

Id. at 402.

40

See Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404, 411 (1923) (holding the same as Meyer, its
companion case).
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rights of students and parents. Here, the issue in question was the power of the state
in the critical area of defining curriculum. And, the Court held that the state need
only show a rational relationship between a regulation and a legitimate state interest
to avoid running afoul of the Constitution.
The Court next addressed primary/secondary education in Pierce v Society of
Sisters.41 The Oregon Compulsory Education Act, effective September 1926,
required that all children attend public schools.42 After again recognizing the power
of the state to regulate schools, the Court again applied a rational basis test to find
the statute unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment.43
Thus, the Court’s first two decisions dealing with schools are instructive with
regard to the perceived role of the state in the process of education. Both cases
recognized the state’s interest in regulating education. Both cases applied the
generous “rational basis” test to determine whether state action in regulating
education was constitutional.
B. Student Speech and the State in the 1940s
In the 1940s, Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis44 and the decision that abrogated
it, West Virginia Board of Education v Barnette,45 first brought the issue of free
speech in public schools before the Court. In Minersville, the Court addressed
whether a statute requiring that students salute the American flag was
constitutional.46 The Gobitis children argued that saluting the flag was contrary to
their religious beliefs and therefore unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.47 A unanimous Court held that the religious rights guaranteed under
the Constitution did not require that the statute be held unconstitutional, so long as
the right to believe, assemble, and worship as one chose was not affected.48 In so
concluding, the Court once again applied a rational basis test, finding the ends of the
legislation in question “legitimate.”49
Less than three years later, however, we mark a major turning point in the
Court’s treatment of student rights. In Virginia Board of Education v Barnette, the
Court again addressed the constitutionality of a state statute requiring salute to the
flag.50 The Court essentially revisited the identical issue raised in Gobitis. In
Barnette, however, the statute was challenged on several additional constitutional
grounds, including freedom of speech.51 The Court explained that the act of saluting

41

Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).

42

Id. at 530.

43

Id. at 536.

44

Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).

45

W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).

46

Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 600.

47

Id. at 592.

48

Id. at 600.

49

Id. at 599.

50

Barnette, 319 U.S. at 626.
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the flag was clearly speech, and that the converse, the refusal to salute, also
constituted expression of a belief or idea.52
Finding that the statute implicated “speech,” the Court applied the “clear and
present danger test,” and found the statute unconstitutional. 53 The clear and present
danger test was the standard then applicable to free speech of this kind.54 Thus, the
Court applied the same standard to student speech as applied to adult speech outside
the schoolhouse.55 Under the rule in Barnette, students in public schools had the
same free speech rights as adults in other contexts.56
It is worthy of note that in reaching its decision, the Court pointed out that
the refusal of these persons to participate in the ceremony does not
interfere with or deny rights of others to do so. Nor is there any question
in this case that their behavior is peaceable and orderly.57
As we shall see below, this focus on interference with the rights of others and
maintaining order in school would become and remain a key concept in the Court’s
student free speech jurisprudence.58
C. Buttons and Armbands
The Barnette flag saluting decision was handed down in 1943.59 The Court
issued no student free speech decisions in the 1950s. However, in 1951, the Court
changed the free speech (not student speech) landscape with its decision in Dennis v.

51

Id. at 630. Interestingly, one of the complaints referenced in the opinion was that the
then-popular “Bellamy Salute” was too much like Nazi salute. Id. at 628 n.3; see also
Children Saluting the American Flag with the Bellamy Salute in 1941, or as its Unofficial
Nickname, the Nazi Salute, PHOTOS OF WAR (Sep. 28, 2012), http://photosofwar.net/historypictures-world-war-images/children-saluting-the-american-flag-with-the-bellamy-salute-in1941-or-as-its-unofficial-nickname-the-nazi-salute/. The Bellamy Salute was abandoned,
replaced by the now common right hand-over-the-heart, as mandated by Congress. Act of
June 22, 1942, Pub. L. No. 623, ch. 435, § 7, 56 Stat. 377, 380, H.R.J. Res. 303, 77th Cong.
(1942) (enacted).
52

Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633.

53

Id.

54

Id.

55

The “clear and present danger” test was first articulated by Justice Holmes in Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). The Court applied the test well into the 1940s. See
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941). The
test was reformulated by the Court into a balancing test in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494 (1951).
56
James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Public Schools, 86 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1347-48
(2000) (stating that, in Barnette, “[t]he Court . . . refused to view the rights of students as
somehow different or separate from the rights of citizens in general”).
57

Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633.

58

See infra Part III.A; see also Lorillard, supra note 17, at 204 (pointing out that collision
of rights concept from Barnette would reappear in the Court’s jurisprudence).
59

Barnette, 319 U.S. at 624.
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United States.60 In Dennis, the Supreme Court abandoned the clear and present
danger test for free speech cases. The Court replaced it with a balancing test, that
test being: "In each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil',
discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary
to avoid the danger."61
Thus, in dealing with student speech cases, lower courts now had two potential
paths to follow: (1) apply the clear and present danger test, consistent with student
free speech precedent as represented by Barnette; or (2) logically, extend the Court’s
application of the Dennis balancing test to student free speech. It was the application
of the Dennis balancing test by lower courts that led to a conflict in the circuit courts,
which in turn would result in the Supreme Court’s seminal pronouncement on
student free speech—seminal in that it distinguished free speech rights in schools
from those in other contexts. Both lower court decisions involved forms of political
protest in public schools – one political buttons, the other armbands.
1. Political Buttons
The Fifth Circuit dealt with student free speech in the related cases of Burnside v.
Byars62 and Blackwell v. Issaquena County.63 Both cases involved challenges to the
prohibition of students wearing political buttons to school.64 Of the two, Burnside
was decided first.
In September 1964, students at Booker T. Washington High School in
Mississippi began wearing buttons bearing the words “One Man, One Vote” on their
perimeter surrounding the letters “SNCC” which stood for the Student Nonviolent
Coordinating Committee—a non-violent Civil Rights protest group.65 Upon learning
of this, the school principal banned the buttons, despite the fact that they were worn
peaceably and created no disruption in the school day.66 Several children who wore
the buttons after the ban was imposed were suspended from school, and brought suit
alleging violation of their right to free speech.67 The district court found no violation
of the students’ free speech rights, and the students appealed to the Fifth Circuit.68

60

Dennis, 341 U.S. 494.

61

United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), aff’d, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).

62

Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).

63

Blackwell v. Issaquena Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966).

64

Burnside, 363 F.2d at 747; Blackwell, 363 F.2d at 751. An image of the Burnside
buttons can be found at: Student Skype with History: Tinker v. Des Moines to Trayvon Martin,
MCCOMB LEGACIES NEWS & UPDATES (May 17, 2012), available at
http://mccomblegacies.org/blog/2012/05/students-skype-with-history-tinker-v-des-moines-totrayvon-martin/.
The
Blackwell
button
can
be
found
at:
http://www.crmvet.org/tim/tim65b.htm.
65

Burnside, 363 F.2d at 746.

66

Id. at 747.

67

Id.

68

Id. at 746.
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The court of appeals in Burnside reviewed the prohibition of political buttons in
school under the Supreme Court’s free speech standard as articulated in Dennis.69
The “evil” to be regulated in the Fifth Circuit’s opinion was disruption to the
maintenance of an orderly program of classroom learning.70 Because the wearing of
buttons did not actually disturb the decorum of the classroom, the Fifth Circuit held
that the prohibition of the buttons by the school violated the students’ first
amendment right to free speech.71
In the related decision of Blackwell v. Issaquena County, the Fifth Circuit
considered a case that was virtually identical to Burnside factually, with one critical
exception. In Blackwell, there was evidence of multiple instances of disruption of
school activities as a result of buttons being brought to school.72 The Fifth Circuit
applied the same analysis as in Burnside. However, because in Blackwell there was
evidence that the wearing of buttons had in fact caused a disruption at the school, the
court held that the prohibition did not violate student free speech rights.73
Thus, the Fifth Circuit, applying Dennis v. United States to student speech,
measured the regulation of student free speech rights by the same standard as the
rights of all other citizens. In both cases, the court weighed the state’s interest in
maintaining an appropriate academic learning environment against student free
speech rights. In one case it found that no disruption had occurred, and held the
regulation unconstitutional. In the second case, as disruptions did in fact occur, the
regulation was held appropriate and constitutional.
But, it could be argued that in either of these two cases school officials could
have “anticipated” a disruption to the school environment. The Fifth Circuit’s
decisions were not based on an anticipation of disruption, but on a post hoc analysis
that found actual disruption in one case, and no disruption in the other. Is an actual
disturbance required in order for schools to constitutionally regulate speech? This is
the question that was implicitly addressed and answered by the district court in
Tinker.
2. Armbands
74

Tinker v. Des Moines is the student speech case that was ultimately heard by the
United States Supreme Court and set the standard for the regulation of student
speech in public schools. Like the Fifth Circuit cases of Burnside and Blackwell that
preceded it, Tinker involved political speech by students.
In Tinker, the speech in question involved the wearing of black armbands to
protest the Vietnam War.75 School officials learned of a student plan to wear the
armbands, and promulgated a regulation prohibiting the wearing of armbands on
69

Id. at 748.

70

Id.

71

Id. at 749.

72

Blackwell v. Issaquena Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966).

73

Id. at 754.

74

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971, 972 (S.D. Iowa 1966),
rev’d, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
75

Id.
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school grounds. Despite notification of the regulation, the students wore the
armbands, and were suspended as a result.76
The procedural history of Tinker in the lower courts is interesting on several
levels, the first being the brevity of analysis of the legal issue in question. The
substance of the district court opinion is barely two pages in length.77 On appeal, the
Eighth Circuit affirmed en banc, without opinion.78
In addition to brevity, it is of interest to note that the decision by the district court
was handed down after Burnside and Blackwell. In fact, the district court recognized
the Fifth Circuit’s holding in its opinion, and explicitly chose not to follow it.79
Though the district court was under no obligation to follow Burnside and Blackwell,
factually, Tinker and the Fifth Circuit cases are analogous. Like the Fifth Circuit, the
district court in Tinker applied the Dennis v. United States free speech standard.80
And, like the Fifth Circuit, the district court focused on the state’s interest in
maintaining an appropriate educational environment as weighed against the students’
free speech rights.81 Where the decisions differ is on the question of actual versus
anticipated disruption. The Fifth Circuit’s holdings in Burnside and Blackwell were
different because the court based its decision on the fact that in one case disruption
of the school environment had occurred, while in the other it had not. The district
court in Tinker opined that actual disruption should not be the standard, but rather:
School officials must be given a wide discretion and if, under the
circumstances, a disturbance in school discipline is reasonably to be
anticipated, actions which are reasonably calculated to prevent such a
disruption must be upheld by the Court. 82
Thus, the district court’s decision was that reasonable anticipation of disruption
of the school environment was sufficient to allow for regulation of otherwise
protected speech.
Once the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this holding, en banc and
without opinion as stated above, the Supreme Court was faced with a conflict in the
circuits. The Fifth Circuit required a showing of actual disruption of the school
environment in order to regulate student speech. The Eighth Circuit allowed
regulation if such actions were reasonably calculated to prevent a disruption.
III. TINKER AND PROGENY
The brief history provided thus far helps us to place the Supreme Court’s
decision in Tinker, which we analyze below, in context. The earliest Supreme Court
cases involving public schools gave administrators substantial latitude, and applied a
76

Id.

77

Id. at 972-73.

78

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 383 F.2d 988 (1967), rev’d, 393 U.S.
503 (1969).
79

Tinker, 258 F. Supp. at 973.

80

Id. at 972.

81

Id.

82

Id.
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rational basis test to regulations affecting schools. This treatment was consistent
with the historical relationship between students and administrators in U.S. public
schools, a history which we have seen gave administrators substantial control over
students. The first flag saluting case—Gobitis—maintained this tack, allowing
regulation of student speech in the interests of pedagogy.
As noted above, the Court reversed this direction just three years later. In
abrogating Gobitis, the Court addressed virtually identical facts, but held that student
speech rights were subject to the same standard as the speech rights of all other
categories of citizens in all other contexts. This holding is remarkable when one
considers that the Court essentially held that the free speech rights of a first grader in
her public school classroom are the same as those of any other citizen. This
expansive view of the free speech rights of school children was revisited by the
Supreme Court in Tinker.
A. Tinker v. Des Moines
In Tinker, the Supreme Court pared back its expansive interpretation of student
free speech rights. It did so in several ways. First, after a short paragraph defining
the wearing of armbands as “speech,” the Court began its discussion by stating that
First amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of
the school environment, are available to teachers and students. It can
hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.83
Although the more often quoted line from Tinker is the second sentence, we shall
see that it is the qualifying language regarding the “special characteristics of the
school environment” that has dominated the Court’s subsequent schoolhouse
jurisprudence.
A second paring back of student rights is found in the wording of the Tinker
standard, a standard that has been called the touchstone for all cases dealing with
student free speech rights.84 The Court’s key language is worth quoting in full:
A student's rights, therefore, do not embrace merely the classroom hours.
When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus
during the authorized hours, he may express his opinions, even on
controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without
"materially and substantially interfer[ing] with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school" and without
colliding with the rights of others. Burnside v. Byars, supra, at 749. But
conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason -whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior -- materially
disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the
rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech. Cf. Blackwell v. Issaquena County
Board of Education, 363 F.2d 749 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1966).85
83

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist, 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).

84

Hayward, supra note 18, at 104.

85

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
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Applying this standard, the Court found that banning students from wearing
armbands to protest the Vietnam War was unconstitutional.86
This standard is called the “substantial disruption test.” This, however, is a
misnomer at least in part—the standard is not only about disruption of the school
environment. In articulating the Tinker standard, the Court twice mentions
interference with the rights of others. While the Court cites both Blackwell and
Burnside in support of this standard, each of those cases focused only on the
disruption of a school environment component of the test. Likewise, the district
court in Tinker analyzed the case only in light of the need to maintain “a scholarly,
disciplined atmosphere within the classroom.”87 Although not cited by the Supreme
Court, it is the Court’s prior precedent in Barnette—the second flag saluting case—
which forms the basis for this standard, and includes two elements: disruption of the
environment or interference with the rights of others.88 Recall Barnette:
the refusal of these persons to participate in the ceremony does not
interfere with or deny rights of others to do so. Nor is there any question
in this case that their behavior is peaceable and orderly.89
Thus, under Tinker, the Court protected student speech only if it does not: (1)
disrupt the classroom; or (2) invade the rights of others.90
Finally, the Court pared back student speech rights in the manner in which it
applied the new student free speech standard to the facts. In articulating the test, the
Court speaks of actual disruption, which is the standard applied in Burnside and

86

Id. at 514.

87

Tinker, 258 F. Supp. at 972.

88

Lorillard, supra note 17, at 209-10 (pointing out that although standard is clearly
disjunctive, courts seldom apply second prong alone).
89

Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 626 (1943).

90

See J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1122-23
(C.D. Cal. 2010) (citing Harper ex rel. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166,
1169 (9th Cir. 2006)) (conducting “rights of others” analysis under Tinker to uphold ban on tshirt attacking homosexuality), vacated as moot, 549 U.S. 1262 (2007), remanded, 485 F.3d
1052 (9th Cir. 2007). A number of legal scholars advocate use of Tinker’s second “rights of
others” prong to address cyber bullying. See Joe Dryden, School Authority Over Off-Campus
Student Expression in the Electronic Age: Finding a Balance Between a Student's
Constitutional Right to Free Speech and the Interest of Schools in Protecting School Personnel
and Other Students from Cyberbullying, Defamation, and Abuse 151 (Dec. 2010)
(unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, University of North Texas) (on file with UNT Digital
Library) (“Through the full application of Tinker's first and second prongs an appropriate
balance can be achieved between a student's constitutional right to free speech and the
interests of schools in protecting school personnel and other students from cyber bullying,
defamation, and abuse.”); Martha McCarthy, Student Expression that Collides with the Rights
of Others: Should the Second Prong of Tinker Stand Alone?, 240 ED. L. REP. 1, 1 (2009)
(“Courts should give more credence to Tinker's second prong.”); Matthew I. Shiffhauer,
Uncertainty at the “Outer Boundaries” of the First Amendment: Extending the Arm of School
Authority Beyond the Schoolhouse Gate into Cyberspace, 24 ST. JOHN’S J.L. COMM. 731, 763
(2010) (“Tinker's ‘rights of others prong’ can provide the necessary middle-ground and
prevent courts from rendering the ‘substantial disruption’ prong meaningless.”).
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Blackwell. Yet, in applying the standard and reversing the district court, the Court
speaks repeatedly of anticipation or foreseeability of disruption, stating:
[O]ur independent examination of the record fails to yield evidence that
the school authorities had reason to anticipate that the wearing of the
armbands would substantially interfere with the work of the school or
impinge upon the rights of other students.91
Even an official
memorandum prepared after the suspension that listed the reasons for the
ban on wearing the armbands made no reference to the anticipation of
such disruption. . . .92
Clearly, the prohibition of expression of one particular opinion, at least
without evidence that it is necessary to avoid material and substantial
interference with schoolwork or discipline, is not constitutionally
permissible. . . .93
[T]he record does not demonstrate any facts which might reasonably have
led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material
interference with school activities. . . .94
Thus, the outcome of Tinker is that school administrators may regulate student
speech if the regulation aims at preventing a foreseeable: (1) material or substantial
disruption in the school environment; or (2) invasion of the rights of others.95
Anticipation of a disruption or of an invasion of the rights of another is sufficient to
allow administrators to act.96 The Court left much to administrator’s discretion.
B. Bethel v. Fraser
The next case to bring the issue of student speech before the Supreme Court was
the 1986 decision of Bethel v. Fraser.97 Fraser involved an allegedly vulgar and
offensive speech98 given by a student that the school found to violate a school
91

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.

92

Id. (emphasis added).

93

Id. at 511 (emphasis added).

94

Id. at 514 (emphasis added).

95

See Saxe ex rel. Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 217 (3d Cir. 2001)
(stating that schools may regulate speech under Tinker if they reasonably believe “that speech
will cause actual, material disruption”).
96
See Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 596 (6th Cir. 2007); LaVine ex rel. LaVine v.
Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2001).
97

See generally Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 675 (1986).

98

Justice Brennan’s concurrence sets out the speech in full:

I know a man who is firm—he’s firm in his pants, he’s firm in his shirt, his character
is firm—but most . . . of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm. Jeff
Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he’ll take an
issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn’t attack things in spurts—he drives hard,
pushing and pushing until finally—he succeeds. Jeff is a man who will go to the very
end—even the climax, for each and every one of you. So vote for Jeff for A. S. B.
vice-president—he’ll never come between you and the best our high school can be.
Id. at 687.
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regulation against obscene and profane language and gestures.99 The student was
suspended, and brought suit alleging violation of his right to free speech.100
Applying the Tinker standard, both the district court and the court of appeals found
that the student’s free speech rights were violated by the punishment.101 The
Supreme Court reversed.102
In Fraser, the Court relied on two considerations in reaching its decision. The
first was the function of the public schools—to “prepare pupils for citizenship in the
Republic. . . . It must inculcate the habits and manners of civility as values in
themselves conducive to happiness and as indispensable to the practice of selfgovernment in the community and the nation.”103
The second consideration was the “sensibilities of Fraser’s fellow students.”104
In this regard, the Court recognized the “obvious concern on the part of parents, and
school authorities acting in loco parentis, to protect children -- especially in a captive
audience -- from exposure to sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd speech.”105 This
second consideration is strikingly similar to the allowance under Tinker for
regulation of student speech when it “collides with the rights of others.”106 Based on
these two considerations, the Court found the suspension was an acceptable response
to Fraser’s speech.107
The Court also distinguished Tinker, pointing out that the speech involved in
Fraser was not political speech.108 And, most importantly, the Court clarified the
fact that Tinker limited the free speech rights of students, emphasizing that those
rights were not coextensive with the free speech rights of adults in other contexts:
[T]he constitutional rights of students in public school are not
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings. As
cogently expressed by Judge Newman, “the First Amendment gives a
high school student the classroom right to wear Tinker's armband, but not
Cohen's jacket.”109
Summing all these arguments in one sentence, the Court stated, “The undoubted
freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools and classrooms
must be balanced against the society's countervailing interest in teaching students the
boundaries of socially appropriate behavior,” which the Court also referred to as
99

Id. at 678.

100

Id. at 679.

101

Id.

102

Id. at 687.

103

Id. at 681.

104

Id. at 682.

105

Id. at 684.

106

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist, 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1967).

107

Bethel, 478 U.S. at 687.

108

Id. at 680.

109

Id. at 682-83 (citing Thomas ex rel. Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1057 (2d
Cir. 1979) (concurring in result).
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“fundamental values.”110 As we shall argue below, the regulation of speech under
Fraser’s “fundamental values standard” is one tool available to administrators in
protecting victims of cyber bullying.111
C. Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier
Two years after Fraser, the Court again addressed student speech in
Kuhlmeier,112 which involved an issue arguably at the heart of free speech—the
publication of a newspaper. In this case, it was a high school newspaper. The
principal of Hazelwood East High School refused to publish two articles, written by
students—one concerning three students’ experience with pregnancy, the other about
divorce.113 The students brought suit alleging violation of their right to free
speech.114 The Eighth Circuit applied Tinker and found for the students, as there was
“no evidence in the record that the principal could have reasonably forecast that the
censored articles or any materials in the censored articles would have materially
disrupted classwork or given rise to substantial disorder in the school.”115
The Supreme Court refused to apply the Tinker analysis to Kuhlmeier. Rather,
the Court distinguished the question of whether a school must tolerate student speech
due to free speech concerns (Tinker) from the question of whether the First
Amendment requires schools to affirmatively promote particular speech by
students.116 It held that activities falling under this second category, such as a school
newspaper, a school theatrical production, etc. which are activities bearing the
imprimatur of the school, may be regulated so long as the school’s “actions are
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”117 Again, the Court applied
a rational basis test to the school environment.
The Court directly quoted from Fraser regarding student rights in schools not
being coextensive with adult rights.118 Moreover, the Court characterized Fraser as
110

Id. at 681. As the Court stated in full:

These fundamental values of “habits and manners of civility” essential to a democratic
society must, of course, include tolerance of divergent political and religious views,
even when the views expressed may be unpopular. But these “fundamental values”
must also take into account consideration of the sensibilities of others, and, in the case
of a school, the sensibilities of fellow students. The undoubted freedom to advocate
unpopular and controversial views in schools and classrooms must be balanced
against the society’s countervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of
socially appropriate behavior. Even the most heated political discourse in a
democratic society requires consideration for the personal sensibilities of the other
participants and audiences.
111

See infra Part V.

112

Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).

113

Id. at 263.

114

Id. at 264.

115

Id. at 265.

116

Id. at 270-71.

117

Id. at 273.

118

Id. at 266 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)).
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standing for the proposition that “the school was entitled to ‘disassociate itself’ from
the speech in a manner that would demonstrate to others that such vulgarity is
“wholly inconsistent with the ‘fundamental values’ of public school education.”119
Thus, to the extent that the student speech involved may be perceived as bearing the
imprimatur of the school, the rational basis test applies to school regulations.120
D. Morse v. Frederick
The most recent Supreme Court decision on student speech was handed down in
2007.121 Morse involved suit brought by a high school student who was suspended
for orchestrating the unfurling of a banner at a school-sponsored event.122 The
banner bore the phrase “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.”123 The case was appealed to the
Supreme Court from a decision by the Ninth Circuit which, applying Tinker, found
that the student’s speech could not be regulated because it did not create a risk of
substantial disruption.124
The Court began by conducting an analysis of its prior student free speech
precedent, from which it drew two key principles: (1) the “rights of students in
public school are not coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings;” and (2)
“Tinker is not the only basis for restricting student free speech.”125 The Court
emphasized that the nature of the rights of students should be “what is appropriate
for children in school.”126
Given the foregoing premises, the Court framed the issue in Morse as “whether a
principal may, consistent with the First Amendment, restrict student speech at a
school event, when that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug
use.”127 In analyzing the issue, the Court reviewed statistics regarding student drug
abuse, Congressional action aimed at drug abuse prevention, and school board
policies across the nation aimed at conveying to students the message that using
illegal drug use is harmful.128 The Court noted the peer pressure aspect of drug
abuse, and that “students are more likely to use drugs when the norms in school
appear to tolerate such behavior.”129 Based on the state’s important interest in
preventing drug abuse in youths, the Court held that school regulation of student
speech at a school event, “when that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting
illegal drug use” is acceptable.130
119

Id. at 266-67.

120

Id. at 273.

121

Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).

122

Id. at 396.

123

Id. at 396-97.

124

Id. at 399.

125

Id. at 404-05.

126

Id.

127

Id. at 403.

128

Id. at 407-08.

129

Id. at 408.

130

Id. at 410.
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IV. THE CURRENT STATE OF STUDENT FREE SPEECH RIGHTS
As we have seen, prior to the Supreme Court’s entry into the arena of public
schools, administrators had practically carte blanche discretion in educating and
disciplining students. And, as Justice Thomas argued, there is no evidence that the
Framers were thinking of the rights of children in public schools when they drafted
the First Amendment.131 Thus, protection of student free speech, from a strict
construction perspective, is likely unjustifiable.
That said, it is a practical fact that the adult citizens of tomorrow are the students
of today. And an understanding of the concept of free speech, as well as evolution
of the habits of minds that devolve from this freedom and the zealous debate it
protects, cannot be granted to students whole cloth upon graduation. An
appreciation for the freedom to express one’s opinion, and the growth in terms of
personal opinions and character that it fosters, must be introduced to students over
time, and in an age appropriate manner.132 This is a process that is primarily, though
not exclusively, the province of schools.
Yet, while we may entrust this process to schools, history has taught us that we
should not do so blindly. Just as schools have historically been given broad
discretion in forming children into responsible citizens, history also teaches that
nowhere are citizens more vulnerable to indoctrination. In schools, they are not only
a captive audience, but of tender age when values, and prejudices, can be inculcated
to greatest benefit—or harm.133 Thus, while the Framers may not have had students
in mind when they defined the protections of free speech, the practical reality is that
such protections must begin somewhere. And, the Court’s jurisprudence has—by
fits and starts to be sure—circumscribed practical limits to what the state can and
cannot do.
As we have seen, at the outset, there was simply no protection of student speech.
From “protecting nothing,” the Court moved to “protecting everything.” The high
point in the protection of student speech came at the start—when the Court
abrogated Gobitis and for the first time recognized student free speech rights in
public schools. In that case—Barnette—the Court made the free speech rights of
students in public schools co-extensive with those of adults in any other context.
While this may be ideal, such broad protection is inconsistent both with the practical
realities of the ages of children in schools and schools’ obligations “to inculcate
habits and manners of civility.”134 From that point forward, the Court has engaged in
a slow retreat from this broad protection of student speech.
131

Id. at 410-11.

132

Algeria Ford, Chalk Talk—School Liability: Holding Middle Schools Liable for CyberBullying Despite Their Implementation of Internet Usage Contracts, 38 J.L. & EDUC. 535,
536-37 (2009) (citing Satariano v. Sleight, 129 P.2d 35, 39 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1942))
(discussing that schools owe an obligation to maintain children safe, and must exercise degree
of acre commensurate with the immaturity of their charges).
133

See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist, 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1967) (“In our
system, students may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State
chooses to communicate. They may not be confined to the expression of those sentiments that
are officially approved.”).
134

Vernonia Sch. Dist 47j v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655-56 (1995) (citing Bethel v. Fraser,
478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986)).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol61/iss2/5

22

2013]

CYBER BULLYING AND FREE SPEECH

379

In Tinker, the Court articulated essentially the same standard as Barnette’s—
protection of the school environment and of the rights of others—but clearly stated
that student speech rights must be considered “in light of the special characteristics
of the school environment,”135 essentially taking into account the ages of children in
schools and school’s obligations “to inculcate the habits and manners of civility.”136
The Court’s application of the substantial disruption standard further weakened
“student rights” by making it clear that anticipated disruption was sufficient to
justify state action. Subsequent student speech cases have further reduced the scope
of protected student speech—Fraser removed obscene and lewd speech from
protection and introduced the notion of inculcation of “fundamental values;”
Kuhlmeier eliminated speech bearing the imprimatur of the school from protection;
Morse further allowed restriction of speech at any school event (regardless whether
it might bear the imprimatur of the school) if that speech promotes illegal drug use.
With each case it has heard, the Court has reduced the scope of protected student
speech.
Yet, the Court and commentators have warned against an approach to free speech
analysis that declares new areas of speech “unprotected” based upon “an ad hoc
balancing of relative social costs and benefits.”137 How do we, and more importantly
school administrators, measure what is constitutionally acceptable regulation of
student speech? The Supreme Court’s most recent student free speech case provides
two key points of departure: (1) the “rights of students in public school are not
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings;” and (2) “Tinker is not the
only basis for restricting student free speech.”138 Parting from this basis, the Court
in Morse found that school administrators may constitutionally regulate student
speech that encourages illegal drug use.
Given our analysis of Supreme Court cases above, we extract the following
paradigm to guide school administrators in the area of student free speech:
(1) Free speech rights of students should be “what is appropriate for
children in school.”139 The “rights of students in public school are not
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.”140 This means not
only that children are to be treated differently from adults, but that
children of different ages should be treated in a manner which is ageappropriate.141 In other words, when it comes to free speech, schools are
different from other contexts.
(2) Student speech that may substantially disrupt the school environment
or invade the rights of others may be prohibited. Tinker’s substantial
135

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.

136

Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681.

137

United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010).

138

Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 404-05 (2007).

139

Id.

140

Id.

141

See Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist., 523 F.3d 668, 674 (7th Cir. 2008)
(Posner, J.) (pointing out the difference between adult debates on social issues versus debates
among children).
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disruption test provides one of several bases for regulating student
speech.142 School administrators may regulate student speech if the
regulation aims at preventing a foreseeable:143 (a) material or substantial
disruption in the school environment; or (b) invasion of the rights of
others.144
(3) School administrators may regulate student speech in order to protect
the educational environment and the inculcation of fundamental values.145
School administrators also have the power—beyond Tinker—to regulate
student speech.146 They have “the power and indeed the duty to inculcate
the habits and manners of civility.”147 This includes taking reasonable
steps to protect the educational environment and process.
V. FREE SPEECH AND CYBER BULLYING
The Supreme Court has yet to review a cyber bullying case. As the Threat to
Speech article correctly asserts, the courts that have dealt with student bullying or
cyber bullying and free speech claims can be divided into essentially two primary
lines of analysis.148 In situations where the conduct in question involved aggressive
language and threats of violence, the courts have applied the “true threats” doctrine,
which holds that threatening words are not protected speech.149 In cases where no
142

Morse, 551 U.S. at 404-05.

143
“School officials have an affirmative duty to not only ameliorate the harmful effects of
disruptions, but to prevent them from happening in the first place.” Lowery v. Euverard, 497
F.3d 584, 596 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing LaVine ex rel. LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d
981, 989 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Tinker does not require school officials to wait until disruption
actually occurs before they may act.”)).
144

See Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 217 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that
school may regulate speech under Tinker if it reasonably believes “that speech will cause
actual, material disruption”).
145

We are not the first to focus on the Court’s “inculcation of values” approach to
education. See, e.g., Richard L. Roe, Valuing Student Speech: The Work of the Schools as
Conceptual Development, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 1269, 1274 (1991) (“The Supreme Court
currently views the work of the schools to be the inculcation of values.”). See generally C.
Thomas Dienes & Annemargaret Connolly, When Students Speak: Judicial Review in the
Academic Marketplace, 7 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 343, 381-84 (1989); Anne Proffitt Dupre,
Should Students Have Constitutional Rights? Keeping Order in the Public Schools, 65 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 49, 85-86 (1996); William B. Senhauser, Note, Education and the Court: The
Supreme Court’s Educational Ideology, 40 VAND. L. REV. 939, 973-78 (1987).
146

Morse, 551 U.S. at 404-05.

147

Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47j v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995) (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No.
403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986)).
148

Hayward, supra note 18, at 111-17.

149

D.J.M. ex rel. D. M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 764-65 (8th Cir.
2011) (stating that student’s instant messages outside of school, which threatened killing of
ex-girlfriend and others, constituted true threats); Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 38
(2d Cir. 2007) (stating that school official’s authority to regulate student speech is much
broader than the bounds of the true threats doctrine); J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch.
Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 868-69 (Pa. 2002) (applying true threats doctrine to cyber bullying
YouTube video); D.C. v. R.R., 106 Cal. Rptr. 3d 399, 425-26 (Ct. App. 2010) (finding that
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true threat was alleged or found to exist, courts have applied Tinker and analyzed the
speech to determine if there was a substantial disruption to the school environment,
an imposition on the rights of others, or both.150
Thus, in dealing with cyber bullying, as a general rule courts will apply either the
true threats doctrine or Tinker.151 Both of these approaches clearly have merit. On
this point, we agree with the Threat to Speech article.
We disagree with Hayward, however, regarding the degree of discretion
administrators have over student speech which originates off campus.152 In addition,
we believe that two other approaches—beyond true threats and Tinker—consistent
with our three-part paradigm above, are available to schools dealing with cyber
bullying: the Fraser fundamental values standard, and the fighting words doctrine.
These approaches, we believe, address a gap between the true threats doctrine and
Tinker – a gap into which much cyber bullying conduct falls.

posting on a non-school website was a true threat and therefore not protected speech under the
First Amendment); see also Doe v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 624-26
(8th Cir. 2002) (holding that non-internet letter threatening another student written outside of
school was found a true threat and sufficient to support expulsion of authoring student). See
generally Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (establishing parameters of the true
threats doctrine); Lorillard, supra note 17, at 198.
150
Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 573 (4th Cir. 2011) (stating that
MySpace page created by senior in high school attacking another student was potentially
disruptive under Tinker); D.J.M., 647 F.3d at 765 (finding student’s instant messages outside
of school, which threatened killing of ex-girlfriend and others, constituted foreseeable
substantial disruption under Tinker); Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 2008)
(finding that a student who posted vulgar, deceptive message about cancellation of school
event on blog (off campus) could be punished by school under Tinker due to potential
substantial disruption on campus); Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 38-39 (applying Tinker to find
eighth grader’s instant messaging of icon depicting shooting of teacher was not protected
constitutionally); R.S. ex rel. S.S v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, No. 12-588, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126257 (D. Minn. Sept. 6, 2012) (holding that a sixth grader’s posting that
she “hated” a school employee on Facebook wall, outside of school hours and inaccessible
from school, was not likely to cause substantial disruption under Tinker); Evans v. Bayer, 684
F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1374 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (finding that a Facebook group created off campus
criticizing teacher did not rise to level of potential disruption sufficient to satisfy Tinker); J.S.,
807 A.2d at 868-69 (finding that a student speech created off campus, and posted on website,
that included derogatory, profane, offensive, and threatening statements directed toward one
of the student's teachers and his principal could be punished under Fraser as lewd and under
Tinker).
151

But see Joe Dryden, It’s a Matter of Life and Death: Judicial Support for School
Authority Over Off-Campus Student Cyber Bullying and Harassment, 33 U. LA VERNE L. REV.
171, 203-10 (2012) (Can.) (proposing additional legal standards courts should consider in
dealing with cyber bullying including sexual harassment and the affirmative duty to respond,
the employee speech standard and defamation, and regulating impact, not content).
152
Hayward argues that “[w]hile campus speech is governed under the Tinker tetralogy, the
extent to which school officials can regulate off-campus speech is unclear.” Hayward, supra
note 18, at 108.
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A. Off-Campus Speech
Given the fact that cyber bullying involves the use of electronic media, it is not
uncommon for cyber bullying speech to originate off campus. What then is the
authority of administrators to deal with this speech?
While the Threat to Speech article argues that the courts are in disarray regarding
the application of Tinker to speech that originated off campus,153 two clear lines of
cases exist in this regard.154 There are those cases, comprising the majority, which
apply Tinker, regardless of whether the speech originated on or off campus.155 This
line of cases holds that, so long as there is an actual or potential substantial
disruption on campus, the Tinker standard is satisfied.156
The second line of cases, which is a small minority, seeks to establish a sufficient
“nexus” between off campus speech and the school campus before applying
Tinker.157 Generally, these cases hold that if it is reasonably foreseeable that off
campus speech will make its way on campus, the nexus standard is met and Tinker
applies.158
There is arguably a third category of cases involving situations in which students
engage in off campus speech and go to extraordinary but ultimately unsuccessful
lengths to keep that speech from reaching campus. Only one case we have found

153

Id. at 108-10.

154

J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills provides an exhaustive analysis of court decisions
addressing this issue. J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d
1094, 1102-08 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
155

See Shanley v. Northeast Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 970-71 (5th Cir. 1972)
(applying Tinker to student-published underground newspaper which made its way onto
campus); Killion v. Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 455 (W.D. Pa. 2001)
(applying Tinker to derogatory top-ten list distributed off campus and via email which was
brought to campus by one recipient); Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088,
1090 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (finding Tinker applied to website created off campus containing
mock obituaries of students); Beussink ex rel. Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F.
Supp. 2d 1175, 1180 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (applying Tinker where website created off campus
containing criticism of school officials was accessed by student at school); O.Z. v. Bd. of Trs.,
No. CV 08-5671 ODW, 2008 WL 4396895, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2008) (applying Tinker
to student disciplined for video created off campus and posted to internet that depicted murder
of a teacher); Pangle ex rel. Pangle v. Bend-Lapine Sch. Dist., 10 P.3d 275, 285-86 (Or. Ct.
App. 2000) (applying Tinker to student-written underground newspaper disseminated on
campus).
156

See cases cited supra note 155.

157

Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 2008); Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494
F.3d 34, 38-40 (2d Cir. 2007); J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847,
865 (Pa. 2002).
158

Doninger, 527 F.3d at 50; Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39-40; see also Laura Pavlik Raatjes,
School Discipline of Cyber-Bullies: A Proposed Threshold That Respects Constitutional
Rights, 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 85, 92-93 (2011) (stating that most courts will apply Tinker if
it is likely that disruption will occur on campus).
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addressed this fact situation, which is clearly an exceptional circumstance.159 In that
situation, the court found that Tinker did not apply.160
To be clear, so long as there is a reasonable potential for disruption of the school
environment, no court has refused to apply Tinker. This is hardly a state of disarray.
Yet, even in cases where Tinker might be inapplicable, we believe two additional
legal theories can be constitutionally applied by administrators to deal with cyber
bullying.
B. The Fraser Fundamental Values Standard
Fraser was the first student free speech first case decided by the Court after
Tinker, and notably did not apply the Tinker analysis.161 Fraser focused on the
responsibility schools have to inculcate fundamental societal values in children as a
justification for regulation of student speech—in the case of Fraser, vulgar speech.
As the Court stated:
Surely it is a highly appropriate function of public school education to
prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse. Indeed,
the “fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic
political system” disfavor the use of terms of debate highly offensive or
highly threatening to others. . . . The inculcation of these values is truly
the “work of the schools.” The determination of what manner of speech
in the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with
the school board.162
In summary, schools are responsible for teaching fundamental values, and
American democratic fundamental values “disfavor the use of highly offensive or
highly threatening” language.163
How are schools to accomplish this task if they do not have some discretion in
regulating student speech? The very act of regulating student speech is a lesson to
students with regards to what is, and what is not, acceptable dialogue in a civilized,
democratic society. Schools teach by regulating. To prohibit schools from
regulating speech would be tantamount to prohibiting schools from teaching and
inculcating these critical fundamental values. The Supreme Court recognized this in
Kuhlmeier when it stated “[a] school need not tolerate student speech that is
inconsistent with its ‘basic educational mission,’ even though the government could
not censor similar speech outside the school.”164
The point bears repeating, for it is at the crux of the tension between free speech
claims and the mission of public schools. Schools teach what is appropriate and
159

Thomas ex rel. Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1045-46 (2d Cir. 1979).

160

Id. Even in this case, the court pointed out “territoriality is not necessarily a useful
concept in determining the limit of [school administrators’] authority.” Id. at 1058 n.13
(Newman, J., concurring).
161

O'Shaughnessy, supra note 16, at 47 (noting that the Court did not apply the Tinker
standard in Fraser).
162

Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986).

163

Id.

164

Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988).
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inappropriate by prohibiting conduct and speech which, though it may be
constitutionally protected in our society when spoken outside of schools, is offensive
and counter to the fundamental values schools seek to inculcate. The practicality of
this concept is obvious; the Seventh Circuit provided an excellent example, in
applying Fraser:
In a public forum, the Christian can tell the Jew he is going to hell, or the
Jew can tell the Christian he is not one of God's chosen, no matter how
that may hurt. But it makes no sense to say that the overly zealous
Christian or Jewish child in an elementary school can say the same thing
to his classmate, no matter the impact. Racist and other hateful views can
be expressed in a public forum. But an elementary school under its
custodial responsibilities may restrict such speech that could crush a
child's sense of self-worth.165
Such statements by the Jewish or Christian child do not rise to the level of true
threats. And, depending on the circumstances, may not rise to the level of creating a
substantial disruption in the school or impose on the rights of other students under
Tinker. But, no rational adult would argue that school administrators are prevented
from prohibiting such speech by students—although such speech is clearly protected
when spoken by adults outside the school context.
Under Fraser, school administrators have broad discretion in regulating student
speech provided the regulation is aimed at teaching the bounds of appropriate social
behavior and inculcating fundamental values. This is what we referred to above as
maintaining an appropriate school climate.166 Several courts have extended Fraser’s
application beyond school-sponsored events,167 and have applied it to hold that the
display of confederate flags at school could be regulated,168 and that school officials
could prohibit a student from wearing Marilyn Manson t-shirts to school.169 Neither
of these could be constitutionally prohibited off campus.
165

Muller ex rel. Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1540 (7th Cir. 1996).

166

See supra Introduction.

167
See Denno ex rel. Denno v. Sch. Bd. of Volusia Cnty., Fla., 218 F.3d 1267, 1274-76
(11th Cir. 2000) (extending Fraser to non-school function activities); Chandler v.
McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1992) (extending Fraser to hold school
officials may regulate lewd, obscene, and vulgar speech even if it does not occur during a
school sponsored event); see also J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d
847, 868-69 (Pa. 2002) (noting that student speech created off campus, and posted on website,
that included derogatory, profane, offensive, and threatening statements directed toward one
of the student's teachers and his principal could be punished under Fraser as lewd and under
Tinker).
168

Denno, 218 F.3d at 1275-76 (using Fraser precedent to bar display of confederate flag
in school even absent potential disruption); West ex rel. T.W. v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist. No.
260, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1233-34 (D. Kan. 1998) (applying Fraser to hold that drawing and
display of confederate flag be prohibited and such conduct disciplined), aff'd, 206 F.3d 1358
(10th Cir. 2000).
169
Boroff v. Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465, 469 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that
under Fraser, a high school could prohibit wearing of offensive though not obscene Marilyn
Manson t-shirt).
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Fraser creates a more flexible reasonableness standard than Tinker that balances
the student’s right to “advocate unpopular and controversial views against the
school's interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate
behavior.”170 We refer to this as the Fraser “fundamental values standard.” And, at
least one court has applied this standard to cyber bullying conduct, finding that a
student website, created off campus, that included derogatory, profane, offensive and
threatening statements directed toward one of the student's teachers, could be
proscribed and punished under Fraser.171
C. Cyber Bullying as Fighting Words
The First Amendment has no application when what is restricted is not
“protected” speech.172 The Supreme Court has defined a number of categories of
speech that are of such little value as to not be entitled to first amendment protection,
such as inciting imminent lawless action (falsely shouting fire in a crowded
theater),173 obscenity,174 defamation, child pornography,175 and fighting words.176
This third category—the fighting words doctrine—is arguably applicable to cyber
bullying.
The Supreme Court has defined fighting words as follows:
The test is what [a person] of common intelligence would understand
would be words likely to cause an average addressee to fight. . . . The
English language has a number of words and expressions which by
general consent are “fighting words” when said without a disarming
smile. . . . Derisive and annoying words can be taken as coming within
the purview of the statute as heretofore interpreted only when they have
this characteristic of plainly tending to excite the addressee to a breach of
the peace.177
The test requires an analysis of both the content of the words and the context in
which they are used. The test also measures the reaction of the addressee based on
those of an objective, reasonable person.178
170
Denno, 218 F.3d at 1273-74; see Lorillard, supra note 17, at 212 (citing J.S., 807 A.2d
at 868 (finding if court solely applied Fraser, there would be “little difficulty in upholding the
School District's discipline”)) (arguing that Fraser legal theory is best match to cyber bullying
cases).
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J.S., 807 A.2d at 868-69.
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Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2347 (2011) (determining that
voting of a legislator is not speech); see, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957)
(holding that obscenity is not speech).
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Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51-53 (1919).
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See Roth, 354 U.S. at 476.
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New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765 (1982).
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See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942); Beauharnais v.
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 253 (1952).
177

Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573.
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One state supreme court has applied this doctrine to find that bullying between
children constituted unprotected fighting words. In Svedberg v. Stamness,179 the
North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed a free speech challenge to the issuance of a
restraining order against a fourteen-year-old child for harassment. In Svedberg, the
defendant and his friends had engaged in incessant teasing, calling Svedberg
“Dumbo,” had constructed large snow figures with big ears around the
neighborhood, and on one occasion the defendant stated to Svedberg, “You had
better watch it Dumbo or I will kill you.”180 Based on this conduct, the district court
issued a restraining order under the North Dakota Criminal Code,181 finding “that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent has engaged in disorderly
conduct.”182 The defendant challenged the issuance of the restraining order, arguing
that his words were protected speech.183
The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the free speech challenge in light of
the fighting words doctrine.184 In so doing, the court pointed out that, in determining
what an objective addressee would do in the given context, it was appropriate to take
into account the age of the addressee.185 As the court stated:
No one would argue that a different reaction is likely if a thirteen-year-old
boy and a seventy-five-year-old man are confronted with identical
fighting words. Accordingly, we hold that to determine what constitutes
fighting words, a court must consider both the content and the context of
the expression, including the age of the participants.186
Based on this analysis, the court found that words in question were fighting
words not subject to constitutional protection.187
Were a court to apply the fighting words doctrine to cyber bullying, its “context”
analysis must take into account two important issues. 188
First, as we are dealing with cyber bullying at the elementary and secondary
school levels, the age of the parties involved is a factor. Scientific studies have
confirmed what common sense indicates, that children go through a process of
maturation that includes development of rationality.189 The free speech rights of a
179

Svedberg v. Stamness, 525 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1994).

180

Id. at 679-80.
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Svedberg, 525 N.W.2d at 679-80.
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Id.
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Id. at 683.
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Id. at 684.
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Id.
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Id.
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Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (pointing out that a statement
made with “disarming smile” may not constitute fighting words while same expression made
in different context may); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 778 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (stating analysis of content and context needed for fighting words to be found).
189
Colleen Creamer Fielkow, Bullies, Words, and Wounds: One State’s Approach in
Controlling Aggressive Expression Between Children, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 1057, 1078 (1997)
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senior in high school should not be the same as a second grader’s. The courts have
also recognized that the level of constitutional protection of free speech varies with
the age of the students involved, and so should what constitutes fighting words.190
Consequently, an application of the fighting words doctrine to cyber bullying must
take into account the ages of those involved.
Secondly, in applying the fighting words doctrine to cyber bullying, we are by
definition speaking of speech that takes place in, or imposes itself into, the public
school, which we have seen is “fundamentally different from other contexts.”191
Interestingly, Svedberg did not address regulation of speech in the school context,
but rather regulation of speech by children under a criminal statute outside of school.
If the bullying actions in Svedberg constituted fighting words outside the public
school context, under the more flexible constitutional conditions in the public school
context such conduct could be legitimately prohibited and/or punished in a public
school.
VI. CONCLUSION
“Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to
conscience, above all liberties.”192 ―John Milton
Free speech rights of students are not amendable to a one-size fits all blanket
protection. As children grow in age and maturity, their ideas (and the speech they
use to express those ideas) mature as well. A second grader’s mis-directed chant of
“four-eyes” is not entitled to the same protection as a high school senior’s silent
protest of war by wearing a black armband.193 There is no marketplace of ideas in

(citing DAVID MOSHMAN, CHILDREN, EDUCATION, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: A
PSYCHOLEGAL ANALYSIS (1989)) (analyzing data on the development of rationality in
children); Paul C. Magnusson, Student Rights and the Misuse of Psychological Knowledge
and Language, in SCHOOLING AND THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 92-114 (Vernon F. Haubrich &
Michael W. Apple eds., 1975) (reviewing courts’ use of developmental data to analyze
children's rights).
190
Svedberg, 525 N.W.2d at 684 (citing obvious difference in reactions between a seventyfive year old man and a teenager). Compare Papish v. Univ. of Mo. Bd. of Curators, 410 U.S.
667, 671 n.6 (1973) (per curiam) (holding that expelling graduate student for distributing
newspaper containing “indecent” political speech was unconstitutional), with Hazelwood Sch.
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (holding high school could censor newspaper
articles by students without infringing on the constitution). See also Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v.
Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 523 F.3d 668, 674 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing difference between
adult debates on social issues versus debates among children); cf. City of Houston v. Hill, 482
U.S. 451, 462 (1987) (holding that trained police officer must exercise a higher degree of
restraint than the average citizen in the face of fighting words).
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243, 267 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding public school harassment policy constitutional, though would
not have been outside school context).
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See Dryden, supra note 90, at 167 (distinguishing between expressions about matters of
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second grade, or if there is, it is very small. Context is clearly as important as
content when taking into account prohibitions of student speech.
The Supreme Court’s student free speech jurisprudence recognizes that schools
are different from other contexts, and that children are different from adults. These
differences are at the heart of the Court’s analysis of student speech rights.
Consistent with these differences, the evolution of student speech rights
demonstrates a willingness by the Court to grant greater latitude to public schools in
regulating speech provided that regulation is aimed at appropriate pedagogical ends:
preventing foreseeable disruption in the school environment or invasion of the rights
of others; inculcating fundamental values; protecting the educational process. To
achieve these ends, we have shown that school administrators have several tools
available to them to constitutionally regulate student speech: the true threats
doctrine, the Tinker substantial disruption test, the Fraser fundamental values
standard, and the fighting words doctrine. These doctrines cover a broad spectrum
of student speech—from outright threats, to potentially disruptive speech, to speech
that is inappropriate to the educational environment and the fundamental values it
seeks to inculcate.
There is no doubt that speech that would otherwise be protected outside of the
school context may be constitutionally regulated in public schools. School
administrators must grapple, daily, with where to draw the line. When speech occurs
on campus, or makes itself felt on campus, we believe that good faith adherence to
three concepts will resolve most constitutional doubts:
(1) Free speech rights of students should be “what is appropriate for
children in school.”
(2) Student speech that may substantially disrupt the school environment
or invade the rights of others may be prohibited.
(3) School administrators may regulate student speech in order to protect
the educational environment and the inculcation of fundamental values.
Among the many memories that most of us take from our early school days, two
are probably common to most of us. The first is of instances of experiencing or
witnessing teasing or bullying behavior. The second is of rules, regulations,
prohibitions, and restrictions imposed by school administrators that seemed, at the
time, excessive or unfair. It is likely that most of us have looked back with chagrin
on both of these memories: on memories of teasing and bullying, with regret at not
having done more to stop them; on memories of “unfair” restrictions with a more
understanding and mature perspective.
If we are fortunate, most of us have not had to deal—either as children or
adults—with the extreme consequences of bullying—student deaths. We began this
article memorializing children who died as a result of bullying behavior. They were
school children, all under the age of eighteen, who died too young. They left behind
moms and dads, grandparents, brothers, sisters, friends—all of whom, years from
now, will continue to remember them. Their smiles will be missed. Their laughter
will be remembered. The promise of their amazing potential will never be realized.
And all of the loved ones they left behind will ask themselves, repeatedly—what if?
Could we have done more? How could we have prevented the unbearable tragedy of
bullying rarely addresses matters of public concern and should not be entitled to constitutional
protection).
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their premature deaths? We believe school administrators have the power, indeed
the obligation, to do more.
Let there be no mistake. We believe, as Milton argued, that free speech and
debate is the primary, fundamental, and irreplaceable liberty vital to any true
democracy. And we abhor any regulation by the state that infringes on this right –
be it the right to free speech of an adult or a child. But, we recognize that we live in
an imperfect world, full of grey areas, and that close calls will sometimes fall on the
wrong side of “the line.” If school administrators from time to time err on the side
of protecting a child victim of cyber bullying versus protecting the free speech rights
of a bully, as adults we believe that we can live with that. And so can the victims.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2013

33

